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Abstract
This paper examines optimal social linkage when each individual's repeated interaction
with each of his neighbors creates spillovers. Individuals di®er across rates of time pref-
erence. A planner must choose a local interaction system or neighborhood design before
observing the realization of these rates. Given the planner's choice of design and a real-
ization of discount factors, each individual plays a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with
his neighbors. We introduce the concept of a local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) to
describe a stationary sequential equilibrium in which, for any realization of discount factors,
each individual conditions his cooperation on the cooperation of at least one \acceptable"
group of neighbors. The presence of impatient types implies that some free riding may be
tolerated in equilibrium. When residents' discount factors are known to the planner, the
optimal design exhibits a cooperative \core" and an uncooperative \fringe." Uncooperative
(impatient) types are connected to cooperative ones who tolerate their free riding so that
social con°ict is kept to a minimum. By contrast, when residents' discount factors are inde-
pendently distributed, the optimal design partitions individuals into maximally connected
cliques (e.g., cul-de-sacs). In that case, each person's cooperation decision becomes a pure
local public good. Finally, if types are correlated, then incomplete graphs with small overlap
(e.g., grids) are possible.
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It is well known that repeated play can mitigate free rider problems when social spillovers
exist. Standard results establish that cooperative outcomes are attainable when individuals
are su±ciently patient. These results usually pertain to environments with global interac-
tions | all individuals interact with one another in each repetition of the stage game.1
Less is known when interactions are local.2 Yet, in many instances local rather than
global interactions prevail. For example, a neighbor who leaves his porch light on illuminates
houses in direct view, but not those located further down the street; an o±ce worker may
disrupt the work of those in adjascent cubicles, but not in non-adjascent ones; a gas station
that lowers its price attracts customers away from the station across the street but, perhaps,
not from the one two blocks away.
These local interactions settings share the characteristic that each person interacts with
only a subset of the relevant population. Moreover, the interaction need not be transitive;
one's strategic \neighbors" may not be the same as one's \neighbor's neighbors." This paper
examines repeated play in such settings. Speci¯cally, our goal is to compare consequences
of repeated play across di®erent spatial designs. It turns out that some designs are more
conducive than others to socially desirable outcomes. We therefore address the question of
the optimal spatial or neighborhood design when free rider problems are localized.
A Simple Example
To see how the interaction design itself makes a di®erence, consider a repeated game in
a neighborhood with three individuals. We ¯rst suppose that these three individuals live
in houses arranged in a cul-de-sac. A cul-de-sac is a circular street in which each of the
houses is in plain view of the other two. The importance of this, for our purposes, is that (1)
the actions of each neighbor are consequential to both of the others, and (2) these actions
are observable to the others. In Figure 1 below, the cul-de-sac is represented abstractly
as a graph; the nodes are the houses, and the links express both the presence of potential




1See, for example, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). Some results also pertain to environments with random,
pairwise matching. See Kandori (1991), Ellison (1994), and Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995).
2Related models are discussed in Section 5.
1Each individual can choose one of two actions, \C" or \D". Action \C" corresponds to
\cooperative" behavior, such as mowing the lawn, taking in one's garbage can at the end
of the day, leaving an outdoor light on, or volunteering to maintain a communal garden.
Conversely, action \D" is de¯ned as the \deviant" or \uncooperative" action. In each of
these examples, an individual's cooperative action confers external rewards to others. The
payo®s resulting from the interaction between any pair of neighbors is given by the Prisoner's





In Figure 2, assume d > c > 0 > ¡`. Payo® c is the gain from mutual cooperation, d
the gain from \deviant" behavior, and ` the loss from being cheated. We also assume that
2c > d ¡ ` > 0 so that mutual cooperation is Pareto undominated by payo®s in the convex
hull of the payo® set,3 and the aggregate payo® from having some cooperation is preferable
to having none at all.
While Figure 2 describes the payo®s from a single interaction between two individuals,
we examine activities, such as those mentioned above, in which an individual cannot isolate
his behavior toward one neighbor from his behavior toward other neighbors. In each period,
Neighbor 1 chooses an action, either \C" or \D", that simultaneously a®ects each of his
neighbors. This is indicated in Figure 3 below.
Neighbor 2 Neighbor 3
C D C D
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Figure 3
3Any payo® in convex hull can be arbitrarily approximated by a time averaged pure behavior strategy.
2If, for example, all three choose \C", then Neighbor 1 receives a payo® of 2c. Given this
setup, the interaction is essentially global. Hence, a standard analysis of repeated games
may be used to determine bounds on the discount factor ±i for each individual i = 1;2;3
under which full cooperation, i.e., all neighbors choose \C", is an equilibrium of this repeated
interaction game. To ¯nd this bound, we examine a perfect equilibrium in which the \grim
trigger strategy" | defection is met with permanent reversion to the Nash equilibrium |
is used. If other neighbors adopt this strategy, then each individual i will choose \C" if
c > (1¡±i)d, i.e., the payo® from permanent cooperation outweighs the one shot gain from




; i = 1;2;3: (1)
We now compare this to an alternative neighborhood design. Suppose instead that the
three individuals live on a grid. In Figure 4 below, Neighbor 1 is °anked by each of the other
two. The di®erence between this and the cul-de-sac is that there are no spillovers between
Neighbors 2 and 3. Their interaction is limited to Neighbor 1, who interacts with each as





As displayed above, the one dimensional grid is isomorphic to the triangle of Figure 1
absent one of the links | the one between 2 and 3. As with the cul-de-sac, Inequality (1)
is necessary in order for full cooperation to be a perfect equilibrium. However, unlike the
cul-de-sac, (1) is not su±cient. Perfection entails that Neighbor 1 be able to credibly punish
either 2 or 3 for defecting. When the grim trigger punishments are used, this \perfection"
constraint requires that Neighbor 1 satisfy (1 ¡ ±1)d ¸ (1 ¡ ±1)(c ¡ `) + ±1(1 ¡ ±1)d. For
instance, if Neighbor 3 defects to \D", then Neighbor 1 must prefer to retaliate by choosing
\D" himself, rather than tolerate 3's behavior, even for just one period.5 Rewriting this








4If, for instance, a neighbor enjoys viewing another neighbor's °ower bed, then the spillover coincides
with his observations of his neighbor.
5Standard arguments show that it su±ces to check for single period deviations.
3Interestingly, if d¡c
d + `
d < 1 then an excessively patient Neighbor 1 with ±1 > d¡c
d + `
d
will not punish a single deviator on either side. Instead, he will tolerate uncooperative
behavior by one of his two neighbors. In such a case, potential gain to \containment" of
the bad behavior on one side outweighs the gain to retaliation when a neighbor chooses
\D". Therefore, while the constraint in (2) describes the incentive to credibly punish an
out-of-equilibrium deviation, the opposite of (2) describes the in-equilibrium incentive to
tolerate one uncooperative neighbor.
Inequalities (1) and (2) de¯ne three relevant intervals of discount factors. Low types
satisfy ±L < d¡c
d , and hence, will never cooperate. \Tolerant" types satisfy ±T ¸ d¡c
d + `
d,
meaning that they are patient enough, not only to cooperate themselves, but will also
tolerate uncooperative behavior from one other. Finally, \intolerant" types are cooperative
but intolerant of uncooperative behavior, i.e., d¡c
d 6 ±I < d¡c
d + `
d. Various combinations
of three possible discount factors, ±L; ±I, and ±T can be used to illustrate two important
points about the design problem.
1. In a local interaction environment, patient individuals cannot necessarily obtain full
cooperation as a (sequential) equilibrium outcome.
Suppose, for instance, that all individuals are exceedingly patient, i.e., ±i = ±T; i =
1;2;3. Now compare the two di®erent neighborhood designs of Figures 1 and 4 assuming
the maximum possible degree of equilibrium cooperation in each. It is easy to see that a
full-cooperation equilibrium exists in the cul-de-sac in Figure 1. However, because (2) is
violated for Neighbor 1, the full-cooperation equilibrium does not exist for the grid of Figure
4. The reason is that Neighbor 3 can choose \D" with impunity (alternatively, if Neighbor 3
cooperates then Neighbor 2 can choose \D" with impunity). Since Neighbor 1 will tolerate
such a defection, Neighbor 3 has no reason to continue to cooperate.
Therefore, the cul-de-sac has, in this sense, higher aggregate welfare than the grid. One
might be tempted to argue that this is generally the case, since the former allows credible
retaliation that deters bad behavior. Such retaliation is not possible in the grid. However,
other considerations may reverse this social ordering.
2. A design with incomplete connectivity may be socially preferred to one with maximal
connectivity.
Consider: ±1 = ±T; ±2 = ±I; ±3 = ±L. Notice that unlike the previous example, full
cooperation is not possible in any spatial arrangement. Speci¯cally, Neighbor 3 will never
choose \C". However, there is a partial cooperation equilibrium on the street grid in Figure
4. Neighbor 3 chooses \D", Neighbor 1 chooses \C", thereby tolerating Neighbor 3's bad
behavior, and Neighbor 2 choose \C".
As before, we now compare this to the cul-de-sac. It turns out that with these discount
factors, the only equilibrium in the cul-de-sac is one in which all individuals choose \D". The
4reason is straightforward. Neighbor 3's discount factor falls below the cooperation threshold
so that he always ¯nds \D" pro¯table. While this behavior is tolerable to Neighbor 1, it
is intolerable to Neighbor 2. Neighbor 2's discount factor satis¯es both (1) and (2) which
means that he is patient enough to cooperate in equilibrium, but not patient enough to
tolerate a neighbor choosing \D". Therefore, in a cul-de-sac Neighbor 2 will only respond
to 3's choice by choosing \D", leaving Neighbor 1 no alternative but to choose \D".6 In
this case, then, the grid has higher aggregate welfare than the cul-de-sac. The former allows
the more tolerant, cooperative types to shield behavior of uncooperative types from the less
tolerant ones.
An Overview of the Model and Results
The example highlights an important tradeo®. If individuals are likely to be cooperative
types, then structures with a high degree of social interaction, such as large cul-de-sacs, are
preferable. However, in the presence of uncooperative types, a social planner may prefer to
design structures that limit the social interaction among neighbors. This may entail smaller
cul-de-sacs (e.g., 2-person rather than 3-person in the example) or bu®ered structures such
as the grid in Figure 4.
Which structure dominates depends on the distribution over rates of time preference.
Hence, we cannot use standard analysis of repeated games even when a Folk Theorem
applies (as it does in the cul-de-sac).7 Moreover, we do not suppose that a planner would
necessarily know the discount factors (types) of the individuals. We, therefore, introduce
heterogeneity ex post by having the planner choose a design that \works well on average"
when discount factors are drawn from a population wide distribution.
Section 2 describes a benchmark model which formalizes the problem faced by a plan-
ner. A planner must choose a local interaction structure before observing the realization of
each resident's discount factor. We refer to such a structure as a neighborhood design. A
neighborhood design is an undirected graph where the links determine whether any two indi-
viduals interact. Information °ows are assumed to coincide with the links in a neighborhood
design.
To make the optimal choice, the planner anticipates how individuals will interact with
their neighbors in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game once the spatial plan is set and
types are realized. Rather than study the entire, complicated set of sequential equilibrium
interactions, we limit attention to a particular subclass. We examine norms of conduct that
rely on simple punishments to enforce social cooperation. The concept of a local trigger
strategy equilibrium (LTSE) is introduced to describe a stationary sequential equilibrium
in which each individual chooses to condition his cooperation on the continued cooperation
6More generally, one can show that if c > d¡` then (2) implies nonexistence of any sequential equilibrium
with a positive aggregate payo® in the cul-de-sac.
7With some notable exceptions (see Harrington (1989) and Lehrer and Pauzner (1999)), the individuals
in repeated game models are assumed homogeneous with respect to rates of time preference.
5of at least one \acceptable" group of neighbors. For instance, in the grid Neighbor 1 may
choose to cooperate whenever any one of his two neighbors continues to do so. LTSE admit
possibly some degree of \in-equilibrium" free riding. We speci¯cally focus on optimal LTSE
| those that maximize the planner's criterion in a given neighborhood design. The set of
LTSE is de¯ned and characterized in Section 3.
Results on optimal neighborhood designs are contained in Section 4. The ¯rst of our
main results characterizes the \full information" solution when the distribution over discount
factors is degenerate. With full information, the optimal neighborhood design exhibits a
cooperative \core" and uncooperative \fringe." Su±ciently patient neighbors (\cooperative
types") are maximally connected to one another. However, impatient or \uncooperative"
types are also connected to certain individuals in the cooperative group who are able to
tolerate some free riding. Those who are both cooperative yet comparatively intolerant of
free riders are connected to fewer of them. In this sense, the optimal design minimizes the
degree of social con°ict.
We then consider the case where types are iid. With iid types, the planner cannot
prevent social friction ex post, and so neighborhood size is the primary instrument used
to limit interaction when frictions are likely ex ante. In this case, the optimal solution
is shown to partition individuals into identical, maximally connected graphs, or cliques.
Since individuals in each clique are maximally connected to each other but are disconnected
to those in other cliques, the behavior of each individual constitutes a local public good
for the group. The optimal clique size varies depending on the payo® and distributional
characteristics.
Optimal designs with low neighbor overlap (e.g., grids) are possible, but correlation in
the joint distribution over types is required. We construct examples where grid designs are
optimal when an exchangeable distribution draws from a mixture of both uncooperative
types and cooperative types of various degrees of tolerance.
Section 5 concludes with a review of related literature and a discussion of extensions and
modi¯cations. Finally, Section 6 is an appendix with proofs of the results.
2 The Model
Consider a society with in¯nitely lived individuals denoted by the ¯nite set M with m = jMj.
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0;1;:::;. This society faces an environment with
network externalities. At the beginning of time t = 0, a residential planner chooses a local
interaction system that determines who interacts with whom. We refer to this structure
as a neighborhood design which is described as a collection of subsets N = (N1;:::;Nm).
For each individual i, the set Ni is the collection of individuals with whom i interacts each
period. We refer to this subset as \i's neighborhood". Hence, j 2 Ni means that j is i's
6neighbor. We assume that the relation is symmetric so that j 2 Ni i® i 2 Nj. We will
sometimes use an alternative notation more common in the literature on local interaction
systems: hM;»i where » is a symmetric, irre°exive binary relation on M £ M. We write
j » i when i and j are neighbors.
The neighborhood design simultaneously describes both a pattern of network externali-
ties and the informational °ows in this society. That is, i 2 Nj means not only that i and
j are neighbors, but also that i and j each observe the history of the other's behavior.8
Some examples are given below. Figure 5a exhibits four residents connected as a part of a
1-dimensional lattice. Each individual interacts only with adjacent individuals. Figure 5b
describes a maximally connected graph or clique. All neighbors are connected to each other.
This is the connectivity that might result from individuals living in a cul-de-sac. Finally,
Figure 5c exhibits two connected clusters joined by a \bu®er" individual. This bu®er has
the ability to insulate the behavioral e®ects of one neighborhood cluster from another.
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For simplicity, it is assumed that each period, each resident can take one of two possible
actions. Let at
i 2 fC;Dg denote the action taken by individual i in period t. Action
\C" connotes the \cooperative" action while \D" connotes \uncooperative" or \deviant"
behavior. Individual i's payo® resulting from the interaction of each of his neighbors is




j)j2Ni) denote the behavior of everyone in i's neighborhood, including i
himself. Individual i's t-period personal history is de¯ned as the list ht





A standard notation denotes Hi as the set of all t-period personal histories for i 2 M.





Ni) where ±i is i's
discount factor, and ui is i's stage payo® function. Individual i's payo® at date t is the sum
of the payo®s from each interaction. Hence, if k individuals in neighborhood Ni play \D"
at time t then i's temporal payo® is (ni¡k)c¡k` if he plays \C", and is (ni¡k)d if he plays
\D". This speci¯cation captures both negative scale e®ects of congestion if most neighbors
choose \D", and scale e®ects of positive spillovers if most neighbors choose \C".
We assume that at date t = 0, before play begins, each individual's discount factor is
randomly determined. Let G denote the joint distribution over vectors ± = (±1;:::;±m).
The marginal distribution over i's discount factor is denoted by Gi.
Once a vector ± = (±1;:::;±m) is realized, it is commonly known to all individuals at
8See Section 5 for extensions that break this link.
7the start of play. Each individual then chooses a behavior strategy fi in the ensuing local
interaction game. For each personal history hi, we write fi(h;±) 2 fC;Dg to denote i's
action as a function of history h given a parameter vector of realized discount factors ±.9
Societal behavior in the interaction game can now be completely described by a pro¯le
f = (fi)i2N of strategies. Clearly, the \uncooperative" pro¯le f in which everyone plays
\D" regardless of history is a sequential equilibrium.
The model di®ers from standard repeated game models in two respects. First, the neigh-
bor relation obviously need not be transitive. That is, one's neighbor's neighbor need not
be one's neighbor. Hence, each individual plays a repeated game with a possibly distinct
subset of the population. Second, the dispersion of discount factors ±i introduces hetero-
geneity across individuals. The presence of any number of impatient individuals implies
that the Folk Theorem will not generally apply. Moreover, since strategic behavior is type-
contingent, certain neighborhoods may tolerate some degree of in-equilibrium \cheating."
A planner who knows G must choose a neighborhood design before the realization ±.
A useful analogy is to that of a city planner who knows something about the aggregate
population characteristics, but does not know speci¯c identities of the residents who will
live in the houses she plans to build. If, following the planner's chosen neighborhood design
















where E is the expectation operator taken with respect to distribution G, and ~ at
Ni(f) is the
action pro¯le of i's neighbors induced by anticipated pro¯le f. The maximum posible value
of (3) is (m ¡ 1)c which occurs when everyone permanently cooperates and every pair of
individuals are linked.10
Unfortunately, two issues arise that render (3) inadequate for our purposes. First, if
the planner does not directly in°uence the choice of f, then any design can maximize (3)
provided that the residents play the uncooperative equilibrium following any other chosen
design.11 To rule out designs which are supported by this \punishment-by-beliefs" scenario,
we ultimately restrict attention to sequential equilibrium pro¯les f that maximize (3) given
N. We call such a pro¯le f¤ optimal in design N. Let W(N) denote the value of (3) in the
optimal equilibrium f¤.12 A design N optimal if it maximizes W.
9Only pure strategies are considered in this analysis.
10There are m(m ¡ 1)=2 possible linked pairs, and 2c is the maximal total payo® for each link.
11Speci¯cally, suppose there are two designs, N and N0. In design N all residents choose D (the uncoop-
erative equilibrium), even though other equilibria exist. In design N0, residents choose an equilibrium that
admits some social cooperation even though the uncooperative equilibrium always exists. While design N0
then yields a higher value according to (3), the comparison is biased by the selective choice of equilibrium
in each.
12An explicit implementation approach elicits the value W(N). We omit details as they involve standard
arguments involving the use of the Revelation Principle.
8Second, for tractability we consider solutions to (3) that ignore integer and remainder
problems. For example, suppose that the optimal design called for a replication of ¯nite,
component graphs of size r. To implement this design would require a population size
divisible by r. For our purposes we simply assume such divisibility. While this entails some
loss of generality, our solutions will approximate the actual solutions when the population
relative to the solution size is large enough or when the solution leaves a small enough
remainder.
3 Local Trigger Strategy Equilibria
3.1 De¯nition
Here we introduce a type of stationary, \trigger strategy" equilibrium for repeated play in
graphs. To facilitate our de¯nition, some de¯nitions and notation are needed.
First, for each individual i 2 M and each personal history ht
i let Ni(ht
i) denote the set
of neighbors that have always chosen the cooperative action, \C", in the past, i.e.,
Ni(h
t
i) = fj 2 Ni : aj¿ = C; 8 ¿ < tg:
Next, a collection, T ½ 2M, of sets is comprehensive if for any nonempty set S 2 T , if
S0 ¶ S, then S0 2 T . Comprehensive collections are those that are closed under the taking
of supersets of nonempty sets. Let CH(S) denote the comprehensive hull, i.e., the collection
of sets de¯ned by including all supersets of the set S.
De¯nition 1 A local trigger strategy for individual i in the neighborhood design N is a
strategy fi satisfying: for each vector ±, there exists a comprehensive collection T ±
i µ 2Ni of





C if Ni(hi) 2 T ±
i nf;g
D otherwise:
In words, a local trigger strategy in a neighborhood design is one in which an individual
agrees to cooperate if and only if the permanent cooperators in i's neighborhood is \accept-
able" according to Ti. Local trigger strategies require each person to bind his behavior to a
judicious, though not unique, selection of trustworthy members of his community. Compre-
hensivity guarantees that reciprocity is (weakly) increasingly likely, the larger is the set of
9cooperators. It also guarantees that \D" is an absorbing action for each individual. Since
Ni(hi) can never increase over time, once Ni(hi) = 2 T ±
i nf;g, no subsequent cooperating set
can be included in T ±
i nf;g.
Unfortunately, local trigger strategies entail some loss of generality in the design problem.
Since nonstationary strategies are not considered, a relatively impatient neighbor plays \D"
permanently. The community might be better o® if an impatient type could choose \C"
every nth period. Time varying strategies such as this require more complex recall. By
contrast, local trigger strategies admit a very simple partition of private histories into two
states, \cooperative" and \punishment/free riding," the latter being absorbing.
Hereafter, we associate resident i's local trigger strategy with the set T ±
i and refer to
it as i's collection of \trigger sets." The collection T ±
i = f;g, for example, corresponds to
the strategy, \always play D." The trigger set T ±
i = CH(S) for some S ½ Ni corresponds
to the strategy, \play C as long as everyone in S continues to play C; play D otherwise."
In this case, individual i's cooperation depends on the continued cooperation of everyone
in set S.13 Such a strategy may be contrasted with the trigger set T ±
i = ffjg;fkg;fj;kgg
which corresponds to: \play C if either j or k continue to play C; play D otherwise." We
are now ready to de¯ne our equilibrium concept.
De¯nition 2 A local trigger strategy equilibrium (LTSE) in neighborhood design N is
a collection of trigger strategy pro¯les, T = (T ±
i )i2N; ±2[0;1)m, that comprises, for each ±,
a sequential equilibrium. An optimal LTSE is an LTSE that maximizes the social welfare
criterion (3) in the class of LTSE.
Clearly, the set of LTSE is nonempty since it always contains the un oo er ti e e ui
li rium" T ±
i = f g f r e ch an ea h ± in ve y n ig bo ho d d si n. aturally, we will
be interested in optimal local trigger strategy equilibria. The optimal LTSE strategy of
Neighbor 1 in both the 3-person cul-de-sac (Figure 1), and the 3-person grid (Figure 4) is
described below in terms of the low, intolerant, and tolerant types: ±L;±I;±T.





> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
ff2;3gg if ±i 2 f±T;±Ig; 8i;
CH(f2g) if ±3 = ±L; ±2 = ±T
CH(f3g) if ±2 = ±L; ±3 = ±T
f;g otherwise:
13While the supersets of S are also acceptable, only the cooperation of members of S is essential for i's
continued cooperation.





> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :
ff2;3gg if ±1 = ±I; ±j 2 f±T;±Ig; j = 2;3
CH(f2g) if ±1 = ±T; ±2 2 f±T;±Ig;
CH(f3g) if ±1 = ±T; ±2 = ±L; ±3 2 f±T;±Ig
f;g otherwise:
Since partial cooperation is preferable to none at all, some in-equilibrium free riding
occurs for certain con¯gurations of ± in each design. Notice that in these particular examples,
T ±
1 can be expressed as a comprehensive hull of some set. Generally, this need not be the
case. Again using the three types, suppose in Figure 6 below that Neighbor 3 is tolerant of
a single free rider , i.e., ±3 = ±T, while all others are cooperative but intolerant, i.e., ±i = ±I
for all i 6 = 3.
v v v v v
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 6
For this con¯guration of ±, the following is an LTSE: T ±
i = fNig for each i 6 = 3, while
T ±
3 = ff2g;f4g;f2;4gg. While each of the others requires cooperation from everyone in his
neighborhood, Neighbor 3 only requires it from either of his two neighbors. Despite Neighbor
3's failure to punish each neighbor individually, both Neighbors 2 and 4 will cooperate since
su±cient deterrence is provided by their end-point neighbors.
3.2 Incentive Constraints
Local trigger strategy equilibria are characterized by two types of incentive constraints.
First, if in equilibrium individual i is expected to play \C", then there is no incentive to
choose \D" after any history in which only cooperation in one's neighborhood has been
observed. A second constraint is necessary to ensure that punishment threats are credi-
ble. Player i must ¯nd it optimal to punish an individual j who defects to D whenever
N(hi)nfjg = 2 T ±
i .
To characterize these two constraints, ¯x an LTSE T . Fix a realization ±. For each








so that QT (S) denotes the set of all residents k 2 N who choose \D" when the set Sk
constitutes the neighbors who choose \C". Given an intitial state S0, the transition law
of motion according to T is given by St
i = S
t¡1
i nQT (St¡1) for each t = 1;2;:::. Here, St
i
denotes the set of neighbors who choose \C" t periods after initial state S0. If S¤ is a ¯xed
















i is i's equilibrium set of cooperating neighbors. Observe that (;;:::;;) is a trivial





ij denoting the number of cooperators in i's neighborhood in the equilib-
rium continuation, t periods after the initial state S0
i = Si. Since the sequence fSt
ig denotes


















It also follows that for each t, ¾t
i(Si) ¸ ¾t
i(S0
i) if Si ¶ S0
i.
Now ¯x an LTSE, a resident i, anTo specialize further, suppose that all of i's neighbors are able to punish him if he
deviates (as in the standard repeated game). Then (5) reduces to a generalization of the















As for the second, \perfection" constraint, suppose that S re°ects one or more defections
from the equilibrium level of cooperation. Then individual i's punishment threat following
an observed defection in each set in T ±








¸ (1 ¡ ±i)[¾
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i [ fig) d:
(7)
In Inequality (7), i = 2 St
i for all t ¸ 1 since the equilibrium continuation entails that
individual i use his trigger punishment immediately. By comparison, in Inequality (15),
i 2 St
i for each t < T since the equilibrium continuation there entails that i cooperate until
date T. One can verify then that (7) is the opposite inequality of (4) for the case when
T = 0 (i.e., player i chooses \D" in equilibrium immediately in the following period).
Inequality (7 ) implicitly de¯nes an upper bound, U(¾i;Si), for i's discount factor. If
±i > U(¾i;Si) then the patient player prefers to tolerate a deviation in his neighborhood for
a period. This may occur when, for example, most of his neighbors do not initially observe
the deviation. By contrast, ±i 6 U(¾i;Sinfkg) implies that i can credibly punish Neighbor
k for defecting from cooperative behavior in state Si. Hence, T ±
i may be chosen by i to
satisfy Sinfkg = 2 T ±
i . Since local trigger strategi unish k
for an initial defection from equilibrium, then he is willing to punish k for defecting when
there a fewer than jS¤
i nfkgj existing cooperators. That is, U(¾i;S¤




i nfkg. Hence, it su±ces to check punishment incentives for single deviations
from equilibrium, i.e., whether ±i 6 U(¾i;S¤
i nfkg) whenever S¤
i nfkg 6 2 T ±
i .
Inequalities (5) and (7) determine incentive constraints required to enforce any LTSE.
Speci¯cally, an individual i may cooperate in an LTSE if ±i ¸ L(¾i;S¤
i ), and may punish a
defector k 2 S¤
i if ±i 6 U(¾i;S¤
i nfkg).
4 Optimal Neighborhood Designs
Throughout this section, we assume that optimal LTSE are used (where optimality is re-
stricted in the sense that it is relative to the set of LTSE). The notion of optimal design is
13re at ve o t is la s.
.1 n I it al bs rv ti n
T e r su t b lo re ea s w y h te og ne ty s n ce sa y f r t e p an in pr bl m t be
on ri ia . T e n ta io su p G ef rs he up or of .
T eo em 1. f s pp µ [ ¡c;1 m, he an pt ma ne gh or oo de ig is ni ue y
g ve by he ax ma cl qu : N = M fi fo al i.
. I su p G [0 d¡
d ) th n a y n ig bo ho d d si n i op im l.
ro f ( ) L t s pp µ [ ¡c;1 m. he we ho th t i an cl qu N0 it m0 jM j,
he ax ma LT E e ta ls ha ev ry ne la C. ny ef ct on s f ll we by gr m
t ig er tr te y i wh ch ve yo e p ay D t er af er If uc an qu li ri m e is s, he
W( 0; ) = m0 1) . O se ve ha if 0 = , i e. th cl qu is he ax ma on , t en he
la ne 's ri er on s m xi al ve al po si le ei hb rh od es gn . W no sh w t at
hi eq il br um xi ts an so he la ne ca re li e W N0 f) (m ¡ 1 c. ec ll ha
In qu li y ( ) i th re ev nt nc nt ve on tr in wh n S = Si . in e t e g im ri ge is
la ed y a l i st te ¤
i fi , t e i ce ti e c ns ra nt n ( ) r du es o t e I eq al ty n ( ).
ut n t e m xi al li ue S¤ = Sj = fo al i a d j an so 1
i S¤) = . T er fo e,
he nc nt ve on tr in is i ¸ ¡c wh ch learly holds when supp G µ [d¡c
d ;1)m. Finally,
observe that the perfection constraint, (7), never binds in the grim trigger LTSE in cliques
since in that case (7) reduces to 0 ¸ (ni ¡ 1) ¡ `.
(2) Clearly the bound (d ¡ c)=d is the minimal lower bound for ±i in any equilibrium
of any neighborhood design. Hence, if supp G µ 0; ¡c)m he in ny ei hb rh od es gn
he nl po si le TS is he ne n w ic al in iv du ls la \D ev ry er od Th re or
th pl nn r i in i® re t b tw en ll es gn . }
he as of bs rv bl , h mo en ou di co nt ac or (i e. di tr bu io G i de en ra e
a d p ac s f ll as on he ec or ^ ± :: ;^) f r s me ±) s a im le as wh re ne f
t e t o h po he es f T eo em al ay ho ds Gi en he es lt th s c se oe no gi e
r se o a in er st ng es gn ro le . N r d co di io s u de wh ch he ol Th or m
a pl es Li it d i te ac io is os ib y o ti al nl wh n i re on il ab e s ci l c n° ct
ar se Su se ue t a al si wi l a lo fo th s p ss bi it by ss mi g a up or th t i te se ts
ot in er al .
14.2 The Full Information Optimal Design
Suppose that the planner knows the exact value of ±, that is, let G be the degenerate
distribution that places probability one on some vector ± = (±1;:::;±m). De¯ne the set
- = fi : ±i ¸ d¡c
d g. Let j-j = !, which is the number of individuals that are above
the lower bound for cooperation. A preliminary result establishes that in the optimal
equilibrium in the optimal design, the individuals in - are those that cooperate.
Lemma If G is a degenerate distribution that places full mass on some ±, then the optimal
LTSE in any optimal design satis¯es: T ±
i 6 = f;g; 8i 2 -.
Note: by the stationarity of LTSE, T ±
i 6 = f;g implies that i cooperates in equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that N = (N1;:::;Nm) is an optimal design. Suppose, by contradiction,
that at
i = D for some i;t in the optimal LTSE. Because LTSE are stationary, we must have
at























Let S denote the set of cooperators in equilibrium in design N. Let K = Mn(S [ fig)







> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
Njnfig if j 2 K
Nj [ fig if j 2 S
NinK if j = i
In words, N0 connects i to all the current cooperators in M, and removes him from all





> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
CH(T ±
j [ ffigg) if j 2 S
T ±
j if j 2 K
CH(T ±
i [ fSg) if j = i
15We assert that this is indeed an LTSE and is optimal. First, behavior in K is unchanged.
Second, current cooperators in S continue to cooperate with additional incentives since the
same set of punishers is strictly larger as it now includes i. It remains to show that i has
an incentive to cooperate. Since he is only connected to those in S and since i 2 -, ±i ¸
L(¾;S) = d¡c
d . That is, his incentive contrain ho ds To er fy he er ec io con tr in s
o th se ho ou d p ni h i obse ve ha if de ec s, ve yo e p ni he hi . H nc ,
¾ (Sin ig = 0 Th re or , ± 6 U ¾; nf g) 1.
o ver fy ha T 0 s o ti al o se ve ha in iv du l i cooperates and is connected to all
current cooperators in S. He is also disconnected to all free riders. Hence, in every new link
created in the new neighborhood structure N0 there is mutual cooperation, while in every
deleted link, there had been none. Since T was asserted to be optimal in N, the LTSE T 0
is optimal in N0.




Nj(f)) 8j 2 K since all the defecting individuals who were previously connected to
i received a payo® of 0 from interacting with a mutually defective individual. Observe
next uk(e at
N0
k(f)) = uk(e at






ij(d). Then, W(N0) = W(N)+jSj(c+c+`¡d) = W(N)+jSj(2c¡(d¡`)).
Since 2c > d¡`, W(N0) > W(N). This contradicts the assumption that N was an optimal
design. }
Since the individuals in Mn- will always choose \D" in any design, the Lemma implies
that there are precisely ! cooperators and m ¡ ! uncooperative individuals. To see how
they are all connected in the optimal design, we begin by partitioning the cooperators in -
by their degree of tolerance for free riders.

















16Using Inequality (6), the set -k is the subset of cooperators in - who are able to tolerate
being connected to at most k free riders out of !+k total neighbors. Note that -k ½ -k¡1,
and it may be the case that -k = ; for some large enough index k. We can now de cr be
the full information optimum.
Theorem 2 Suppose that G is degenerate. Then every optimal neighborhood design satis-
¯es,
(i) i » j; 8i;j 2 -, and
(ii) there exists an ordering, i1;i2;:::;im¡!, of the uncooperative individuals,
such that for each k = 1;:::;m ¡ !, ik » j i® j 2 -k.
Since uncooperative individuals in Mn- are indistinguishable, all optimal designs are
equivalent up to payo®-irrelevant permutations of uncooperative individuals. According
to the result, the optimal design exhibits a spatial pattern with a cooperative \core" and
an uncooperative \fringe" connected to the more tolerant elements of the core. Since the
planner has full information, he knows where the social frictions lie. While all pairs of
cooperative individuals are linked, each uncooperative individual is connected to as many
cooperators as will tolerate his free riding. The gain to each uncooperative neighbor net of
the loss to the cooperator is d ¡ `.
As for the proof, Part (i) in the theorem is a straightforward consequence of the Lemma.
Since connectivity among cooperators increases social welfare, it is clear from the Lemma
that all cooperators in - should be connected to each other. Part (ii) follows from the
assumption that d ¡ ` > 0. When d ¡ ` > 0, there is a net social gain to connecting a free
rider to a cooperator provided that the cooperator is not induced to change his behavior
as a result. Part (ii) is an iterative application of the equilibrium incentive constrai t ( ).
The degree of slackness in the incentive constraints of cooperators determines the feasibility
of adding a marginal free rider.14 However, each additional free rider raises the theshold
required to tolerate subsequent free riders. Hence, if -k = ;, then at most only k ¡ 1 free
riders are tolerated in the network. The rest remain unconnected to cooperators.
The graphs in Figure 7 illustrate three examples of optimal designs. The types L, I and
T correspond to the familiar three types ±L;±I and ±T in Section 1. Recall that low types
L never cooperate; intolerant types I only cooperate if surrounded by other cooperators;
tolerant types T tolerate a single free rider. Type H is assumed to lie in -2 so that this
type tolerates 2 free riders.
14This aspect is reminiscent of Bernheim and Whinston's (1990) study of collusion in multi-market ¯rms.











4.3 Optimal Design with Independent Types
All results in this subsection assume that the discount factors are distributed iid. A sim-
plifying abuse of notation allows that Gi = G for all i. The main result for this Subsection
asserts that only cliques are optimal. Hence, the question of structure reduces to one of
size.
Theorem 3 If discount factors are iid, then the optimal neighborhood design partitions M
into identically sized cliques.
The Proof, which is relegated to the Appendix, is long and tedious. The basic idea,
however, is not complicated. As it turns out, it is always possible to construct a clique that
weakly dominates a given design. To see why, ¯x an arbitary design. Given this design,
there is a link, i » j whose average payo® is maximal among those in the design. Let i
denote the most likely cooperator of the two in the link. If it is the case that for every
±, a defection by this individual would be punished immediately by all his neighbors, then
Neighbor i's \perfection" incentive constraint never binds, i.e., U(¾i;Si) = 1 for all S. This
would have been the case had i belonged to a clique. When the incentive constraint does not
bind, the conditional probability that an individual is patient enough to cooperate reaches
its upper bound. Individual i's cooperation then depends only on the equilibrium proportion
cooperators in i's neighborhood. With independent types, this probability does not vary
with the rest of the design. Therefore, one can replicate the payo® of the most likely
cooperator in the maximal link by simply replicating his neighborhood size throughout
the graph. To do this in a way that requires the fewest individuals in a component, all
individuals in the component must be maximally connected.
The result establishes as optimal the formation of completely connected coalitions or
communities. One person's decision a®ects all in his local community. In this sense, social
cooperation becomes a local public good when types are uncorrelated. The size of each
community depends on the unconditional likelihood of each person's cooperation.
Despite positive scale e®ects of cooperation, the size of these communities need not
















s¤ denotes the number of cooperators in the optimal LTSE. In a clique, the \perfection"
constraint never binds, and so everyone punishes a defector. Therefore, the only relevant
incentive constraint is Inequality (6). Utilizing this constraint, the conditional probability









A Law of Large Numbers argument asserts that this probability is approximated by the
empirical frequency, s¤=m, of cooperation when m is large. Moreover, since s¤ takes on
values from a ¯nite set, a simple perturbation argument restricts the approximation to









Figure 8 exhibits the solutions to this dynamical system for two distributions, G1 and
G2. Point A is an interior stable ¯xed point for distribution G1. If the clique size m is
su±ciently large, then s¤
A individuals cooperate. Point C, at which there is no cooperation,
is also stable. Point B is also a ¯xed point of G1, but is unstable. Indeed with integer
values, it is unlikely that s¤
B will be achieved. For distribution G2, Point C is the only ¯xed
point and is stable. Distributions such as G2 put limits on the size of each fully connected
community.















is ® = 0. Then there is some integer m¤ such that any clique size larger than m¤ cannot be
part of an optimal design.
Proof Let s(q) denote the equilibrium number of cooperators in the optimal LTSE in
a clique of size q. A necessary condition for each i to cooperate is s(q)c¡(q ¡s(q))` ¸ 0 or
19s(q)=q ¸ `
c+`. The Strong Law of Large Numbers implies s¤(q)=q ! ®¤ a.e., as q ! 1 where
®¤ satis¯es (8). By the hypothesis of the Theorem, ®¤ = 0. Now ¯x ² > 0 such that ² < `
c+`.
Given ², there is some m¤ such that if q > m¤, s¤(q)=q < ² < `
c+`, so that no individual i
will cooperate. Hence, the optimal LTSE in the q-clique yields an expected payo® of 0 in






¢¢2c > 0, the
q-clique is suboptimal. }
It is not di±cult to show that the size threshold m¤ weakly decreases in `=(c+`). That
is, optimal clique size diminishes as the relative loss su®ered from uncooperative behavior
increases. We now identify a class of distributions for which the optimal community size
may be easily computed.
Theorem 5 Given iid types, let supp G µ [0; d¡c
d + `




d ) > 0. Then the optimal design is a partition into cliques of size q where q is the










d < ±i < d¡c
d + `
d(m¡1), then i is cooperative but intolerant. That is, i cannot
tolerate any uncooperative types. Therefore i only plays C if all ni neighbors do so. But





Since all individuals are ex ante identical to the planner, the planner will set ni = nj,










(q ¡ 1)c (10)
The solution to (10) is the closest integer approximation to (9). }
Since the exponential decrease in likelihood of cooperation is of larger order than the
returns to scale in community size, the support restriction of G in Theorem 5 suggests
strong decreasing returns to community size at some level when partial cooperation is not
possible. From this, it follows that for any 2 6 q 6 m, there exist parameters, d;c and `
and distribution G such that the optimal design is a clique of size q.
4.4 Correlated Types
When the distribution G admits correlation, then incomplete graphs with low neighbor
overlap may be optimal for certain regions of the parameter set. To see this, we work out
20an example with four people and four types. As before, a low type, ±L, is below the minimal
threshold for cooperation and so will always defect. An \intolerant" type, ±I, will cooperate
so long as every one of his neighbors cooperates and defect if any of his neighbors defects.
The \tolerant" type, ±T, is associated with residents who can withstand one defector for
every cooperator, but not more. Finally, highly tolerant types, ±H, are those that cooperate
as long as a single neighbor cooperates.
First, consider a distribution G which puts full mass on the permuations from the set
f±L;±I;±T;±Tg. The planner knows there are two tolerant types, one intolerant type, and
one uncooperative type (but does not know who is which). The payo®s associated with
each of the structures are listed under Case 1 of Table 1 below.
Graph Neighborhood Case 1 Case 2
Number Design f±L;±I;±T;±Tg f±L;±H;±H;±Hg
1   1
2c 1
2c
2   1
2c + 1
6 (d ¡ `) 2
3c + 1
6 (d ¡ `)
3   2
3c + 1
6 (d ¡ `) c + 1
2 (d ¡ `)
4   7
12c + 5
24 (d ¡ `) 3
4c + 1
4 (d ¡ `)
5   1
2c + 1
8 (d ¡ `) 3
4c + 3
16 (d ¡ `)
6   2
3c + 1
2 (d ¡ `) c + 1
2 (d ¡ `)
7   2
3c + 1
3 (d ¡ `) c + 7
16 (d ¡ `)
8   1
4c + 1
12 (d ¡ `) 5
4c + 5




4 (d ¡ `)
To calculate a particular example, consider graph number 4 in Case 1 of Table 1. With
probability 1
2, the low type lies at one of the end points, in which case there is a 2
3 prob-
ability that the low type's neighbor is a tolerant type. This gives an average payo® of
1
4 (c + c + 2c + (d ¡ `)) =
¡
c + 1
4 (d ¡ `)
¢
. There is also a 1
2 probability that the low type
lies at one of the end points and a 1
3 chance that the low type's neighbor is an intolerant type,
yielding an average payo® of 1




4 (d ¡ `)
¢
. Finally, there is a 1
2
probability that the low type is on the interior with a 2
3 probability that its interior neighbor
is a tolerant type. This gives an average payo® of 1




4 (d ¡ `)
¢
.
21All other possibilities lead to no cooperation, hence a payo® of zero. Overall, the ex-
































24 (d ¡ `).
Note that in the clique (Graph 9), a \cascade" e®ect prevents any cooperation. The low
type is, by de¯nition, uncooperative which induces the intolerant type to be uncooperative
which induces, in turn, the remaining two types to be uncooperative as well, so that no
cooperation is possible. Instead, it turns out that the square or closed grid structure (Graph
6) is optimal. The grid balances the connectivity gains when cooperators are linked against
conectivity losses when social con°icts, say between types L and I arise.
Now suppose that G put unit mass on the permuations from the set f±L;±H;±H;±Hg.
The resulting expected payo®s are listed under Case 2 in Table 1. Since in this case there are
more high types in society, payo®s are, in general, higher across the board. However, along
with the change in payo®s, one sees that the optimal neighborhood design has changed.
Here, the clique is optimal.
5 Literature and Extensions
A large literature models the determinants of group size, the e®ects of congestion, peer
e®ects, and the quality and quantity of public services in local jurisdictions. A small sample
includes de Bartolome (1990), Benabou (1993), Conley and Wooders (1998), Epple and Ro-
mano (1995), Glomm and Laguno® (1998, 1999), Oates and Schwab (1991), and Scotchmer
(1985) to name only a few.15
The structure of residential developments is a common and interesting local interaction
design problem. Social norms of cooperation di®er markedly across di®erent communities.
In many neighborhoods, for example, cooperative arrangements in supervision of children, in
maintaining communal spaces, or in monitoring the safety of the neighborhood are common.
In others less so. Typically, cooperative arrangements, when they exist, are not coerced but
instead rely on reciprocity and voluntary \good will" of the residents. Detailed discussion,
examples, and surveys of the e®ect of spatial structure on these norms may be found in
Logan and Molotch (1987), Landon (1994), Southworth and Ben-Joseph (1997), and White
(1980). Landon, in particular, summarized the relative costs and bene¯ts of cul-de-sacs
compared to traditional street grids this way:
\In especially successful cul-de-sacs, families get to know one another well. Some
cul-de-sacs encourage the development of neighborhood events or stimulate daily
social routines... [Yet], on a straight block of houses, people may see what the
15See Conley and Wooders (1998) for further references.
22neighbors across the street are doing, but people do not feel so tightly entwined
with one another... The cul-de-sac often seems to promote more contact than is
desired... (pp 42-43)
The present work proposes a tractable way of determining when social contact is likely
to be desireable. Problems with local externalities are cast here as mechanism design prob-
lems in repeated games. While we are not aware of other work that does this, the nature of
the linkage relates the present paper to a growing literature on network externalities. These
include a wide variety of applications ranging from macroeconomic growth, e.g., Durlauf
(1993), and buyer-supplier relationships, e.g., Kranton and Minehart (1996, 1997), to infor-
mation transmission, e.g., Bala and Goyal (1998), and social networks, e.g., Chwe (1998).16
Of particular relevance for the present paper is a subset of this literature which examines
strategic (noncoooperative) behavior in networks.17 Often referred to as local interaction
models, examples include Anderlini and Ianni (1995), Bala and Goyal (1999), Blume (1993,
1995), Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Laguno® and Schreft (1998, 1999), and Morris (1997),
among others.18 Analysis of local interaction applied speci¯cally to Prisoner's Dilemma
include Epstein (1998) and Tieman, Houba, and van der Laan (1998).
With a few exceptions, these models tend to be either static or assume adaptive adjust-
ment dynamics. By contrast, the present paper studies repeated game e®ects in graphs with
forward-looking agents. In this dimension, a closer analogue may be found in the study of
collusion with multi-market ¯rms (see Bernheim and Whinston (1990)), and in the study of
multilateral tari® cooperation (see Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and sources contained therin).
Forward looking behavior has also been studied in population games where individuals are
repeatedly and randomly paired. See Kandori (1991), Ellison (1994), and Okuno-Fujiwara
and Postlewaite (1995). In population games, full cooperation is shown to be supported in
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games when discount factors are high enough.19
In addition to local interaction, the present paper introduces heterogeneity in rates of
time preference. It is precisely this heterogeneity which makes the linkage design problem
nontrivial.20 This type of heterogeneity has been examined by Harrington (1989) who
studies the e®ect of discount rate di®erences on collusion in oligoplies, and by Lehrer and
Pauzner (1999) who examine heterogeneity in general two-player repeated games.
A number of assumptions are used in the analysis for tractability. Three modi¯cations
in future work would enrich the present analysis. First, the use of space and distance would
16See also Katz and Shapiro (1994), and Sharkey (1993), and references contained therein.
17This is as distinct from cooperative game theoretic models of networks, some references for which can
be found in Sharkey (1993).
18The Morris paper is a good source for further references.
19Kandori proves a Folk Theorem property for certain Prisoner's Dilemma stage games. Ellison extends
the Kandori result to all PD games when a public randomizing device is available.
20Ellison (1994) introduces time preference heterogeneity as an extension. Since the emphasis there on
whether or not full cooperation exists, heterogeneity does not play a substantial role.
23add a dimension of realism, particularly when the model applies to residential neighborhood
interaction. If, for example, externalities diminish with distance, then a planner may prefer
to mitigate the consequences of certain neighbor's actions by increasing space between him
and others, rather than exclude the neighbor altogether.
Second, the perfect link between information °ows and externalities could be severed.
The more interesting case occurs when the externalities °ow beyond one's observations.21
In such a case, the moral hazard problem is more extreme in larger networks. This suggests
a smaller scale of linkage than before will be preferred by the planner.
Third, the optimal design problem should be re-examined when nonstationary sequential
equilibria are considered. Local trigger strategies entail loss of generality since occasional
cooperation is not admitted. The incentive constraints can be relaxed if, say, a relatively
impatient type need only choose \C" every nth period.
6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3
We ¯rst de¯ne some notation that will be used in the proof:
Fix a neighborhood structure N. Fix S = (S1;:::;Sm) in N. As before, let S = [iSi.















In words, Gnisi is the probability that i is too impatient to cooperate when si of his neighbors
are cooperative. We use the convention that Gms = Gmm whenever s > m. Observe that
G¢si is increasing in the size ni of one's neighborhood.
Lemma 1 Suppose the marginal distributions, Gi; i 2 M are independent and identical.
Then for any neighborhood design N and any LTSE, the probability that an individual i
cooperates, conditional on si, is no greater than 1 ¡ Gnisi.
We refer to 1 ¡ Gnisi as the upper bound on i's cooperation likelihood.
21The case where a player's information extends beyond his externalities is less interesting. To take an
extreme case, if residents could condition punishment on the behavior of everyone, then standard repeated
game arguments can be used to prove a Folk Theorem when the ± realizations are large enough. Kandori
(1992) makes this observation in a random matching model.
24Proof Fix any neighborhood design (possibly not optimal). Suppose that an individual
i who cooperates in equilibrium would be punished by all others in Ni should he defect
at any stage. Of course, an LTSE in which this is true may not exist. However, we need
only establish that 1 ¡ Gnisi is an upper bound, and so if it does exist, then the perfection
incentive constraint never binds for any i who cooperates in equilibrium. The upper bound
for ±i is, therefore, ±i 6 1. The incentive constraint for equilibrium cooperation is then
given by
sic ¡ (ni ¡ si)` ¸ (1 ¡ ±i)sid: (11)
Note that since all individuals in Ni punish i immediately, the right hand side of (11) is










Since Gi independently distributes ±i, (12) describes the an upper bound for i's probability
of cooperation conditioned on si. }
Let µ : K ! K denote a permutation of a subset K µ M of residents. Resident i
is re-indexed to be µ(i) under µ. Let £(K) denote the set of all permutations on the set
K. Note that if jKj = k, then j£(K)j = k!. Denote the subset of i's neighbors who are
successors under µ by
R
µ
i = fj 2 Ni : µ(j) > µ(i)g:
Let sµ



















Note that if µ(i) = k, i.e., µ orders i last in the queue, then Rµ
i = ; and so Gµ
nisi = Gnisi.
Lemma 2
(i) For each i the upper bound on conditional cooperation likelihood, 1¡Gnisi, is binding
if N is a clique.
(ii) If, in any neighborhood structure the upper bound 1¡Gnisi binds, then the probability,
P(S











25Proof (i) Let N be a clique. We show, ¯rst, that the upper bound U(¾;Si) determined
by the perfection constraint is always unity if N is a clique. To see this, ¯x an individual
i who must decide whether or not to punish a defector j 2 Ni = M. If all such neighbors
choose D following j's defection, either to punish j or because they had previously chosen
D, then, using the perfection constraint, i will choose D since
(1 ¡ ±i)(ni ¡ ni)d = 0 ¸ (ni ¡ ni)c ¡ ni` = ¡ni`:
Since this inequality is satis¯ed for all ±, U(¾;Si) = 1, and so there is no upper bound on





(ii) Fix S. The probability that all i 2 S cooperate given si is, precisely,
Q
i2S(1¡Gnisi).
However, the probability that all i 2 MnS fail to cooperate is not
Q
i2MnS Gnisi. The
reason is that S cannot be a conditioning event for all individuals simultaneously. Linkage
induces correlation in the likelihood that individuals cooperate. Hence, we construct an
unconditional probability that \deviant" set MnS fails to cooperate in N.
Fix an arbitary permutation µ 2 £(MnS). For i such that µ(i) = 1 (¯rst in the queue),
Gµ
nisi = Gnini = G(d¡c
d ). Hence, the ¯rst in the queue under µ fails to cooperate with
minimal unconditional probability G(d¡c
d ). Let j be the ¯rst individual in the queue who
has a neighbor earlier in the queue under µ. Then j fails to cooperate, conditional on an
earlier failure, with probability
G
µ
















¯ ¯ ¯N) when each individual's cooperation likelihood is maximal. }
We denote a link in the neighborhood structure (i.e., graph) N by Lij. Abusing notation
somewhat, we will write Lij 2 N whenever i » j in N. Let V (Lij;N) denote the per person,
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A if Lij 2 N
0 otherwise
(14)
26In expression (14), if both individuals i and j cooperate, i.e., if fi;j;g µ S, then the total
payo® in the link is 2c. If, however, only one of them cooperates, i.e., if fi;jg 6 µ S and
fi;jg 6 µ MnS, then the total payo® is d ¡ `. If neither cooperates, then the total payo® is




Now ¯x S = (S1;:::;Sm) in N with S = [iSi, and as before, let P(S
¯ ¯ ¯N) denote the
probability that S occurs in the neighborhood structure N. Let
¹ P(S











Correspondingly, we let ¹ V (Lij;N) denote expected payo® of link Lij when ¹ P replaces P in
the de¯nition (14). Note that by Lemma 2, ¹ P coincides with P when N is a clique. We say









A standard property of stochastic dominance is that for any function g on the vector S
satisfying g(S) ¸ g(^ S) whenever S ¶ ^ S,
P
S ¹ P(S
¯ ¯ ¯N)g(S) ¸
P
S P(S
¯ ¯ ¯N)g(^ S). Therefore,
if ¹ P stochastically dominates P in the sense above, then ¹ V (Lij;N) ¸ V (Lij;N).22 The
following Lemma establishes that this is the case.
Lemma 3 Given N, ¹ P(¢
¯ ¯ ¯N) weakly stochastically dominates P(¢
¯ ¯ ¯N).

















Since Lemma 1 asserts that (1 ¡ Gnisi) ¸ Pr(ai = C
¯ ¯ ¯si;N), weak stochastic dominance of
¹ P over P follows. }
22To see this, just take g to be
g(S) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
2c if fi;jg µ S
d ¡ ` if fi;jg 6 µ S; fi;jg 6 µ MnS
0 otherwise
27De¯ne ¹ P i(S
¯ ¯ ¯N) by
¹ Pi(S



















In words, for each j 2 M, ¹ Pi(S
¯ ¯ ¯N) replaces Gnjsj with Gnisi everywhere in expression
(17). Intuitively, ¹ Pi(S
¯ ¯ ¯N) is the probability that would occur if all individuals faced the
same neighborhood as individual i.


































Proof First, observe from (17) that for each i, ¹ Pi(S
¯ ¯ ¯N) does not vary with any of i's




























¯ ¯ ¯N). That is, i¤ has the
highest likelihood of cooperation. Alternatively, i¤ maximizes E[(1 ¡ Gnisi)jN]. But then,
replacing everywhere 1¡Gnjsj with 1¡Gnisi in the de¯nition (17) yields a ¹ Pi¤ that weakly











Consequently, by Lemma 3,
W
¤(N) ¸ ¹ V (Lij;N) ¸ V (Lij;N) 8 i;j







V (Lij;N) = W(N)
}
For the remainder of the proof, let N be any neighborhood structure. We construct a
clique N¤ that satis¯es W(N¤) ¸ W(N).
Let N¤ denote the unique clique on neighborhood Ni¤. That is, Ni = Nj for all i;j 2
Ni¤ [ fi¤g. Naturally, this also means that Si = Sj in the clique. We now show that the
clique N¤ dominates N.
Observe, ¯rst, that in the clique, by Lemma 1, 2 and the symmetry of the optimal LTSE
in N¤, P(Si¤
¯ ¯ ¯N¤) = ¹ P(Si¤
¯ ¯ ¯N¤) = ¹ Pi¤(Si¤
¯ ¯ ¯N¤). To simplify notation, let n¤ = ni¤ and




















f^ S: ^ Si¤=Si¤g
(1 ¡ Gn¤s¤)

















































Similarly, one can show
X




¯ ¯ ¯N) =
X



































































The ¯rst inequality follows from (19) and the fact that N¤ is a clique, i.e., jfLi¤k 2 N¤gj =
n¤ = jfLi¤k 2 Ngj. The second equality and second inequality follow from Lemma 4. Thus,
we conclude the Theorem. } }
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